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Abstract
Purpose: This  paper  presents  a  study  on factors  explaining  the  level  of  voluntary
human capital information in companies with shares in the Brazilian stock exchange.
Assuming  the  existence  of  information  asymmetry  between  managers  and
shareholders, agency theory states that disclosure might lead to a reduction in agency
costs. The proprietary costs theory indicates that information disclosure might increase
the company’s costs. According to these theories, the likelihood that the managers will
voluntarily disclose information depends on certain factors that are characteristic of the
company.  Understanding  the  disclosure  of  information  regarding  intangible  assets,
specifically  human  capital,  has  strategic  relevance  for  enterprises  because  these
features, although not always recorded in accounting, represent a competitive business
edge in the current economy.
Design/methodology/approach: The  study  examined  145  annual  reports,
representing 29 companies in the period of 2005-2009. The level of voluntary disclosure
was  determined  through  content  analysis  of  annual  reports  using  representative
indicators of human capital information.
Findings: The statistical results indicate that factors such as size, debt, growth and
time of registration with the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission explain the
level of voluntary human capital disclosure of the companies studied.
Originality/value: An important contribution of this research is the formulation and
non-repudiation of the time of registration with the CVM hypothesis as a factor that
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explains the level of human capital disclosure because none of the revised studies have
tested this hypothesis.
Keywords: Information asymmetry, voluntary disclosure, human capital, agency theory, 
proprietary costs theory
JEL Codes: D80
Introduction
This article presents a study of the factors explaining the level of voluntary human capital
disclosure  in  companies  with  shares  in  the  Brazilian capital  market.  Considering  that  the
volume of the Brazilian capital market (BM&FBovespa, 2010) has grown at an annual rate of
27.8% over the past five years, research on the level of transparency adopted by companies
with  shares  in  this  market  is  relevant.  We  begin  with  the  assumption  that  information
asymmetry is  inherent to a contractual relationship (Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973; Stiglitz,
2000). This information asymmetry may create market inefficiency (Arrow, 1963), generating
adverse consequences for  the economy,  such as losses in  market response to  changes in
quality and prices (Stiglitz, 2000); inefficient valuation of shares; high cost of capital; and
excessive benefits for people who have privileged access to information (Lev, 2001, 2005).
Agency theory would suggest disclosure as a way to reduce agency costs due to, among other
things, information asymmetry. On the other hand, the proprietary costs theory indicates that
disclosure might increase the company’s costs. Consequently, according to these theories, the
likelihood that managers voluntarily disclose information depends on certain factors that are
characteristic  of  the  company.  In  the  following  sections,  we  present  a  literature  review,
formulation of hypotheses, research design, analysis of results, concluding remarks, a list of
references and, finally, supplementary information. So, regarding the information assimetry, one
question became the propose of this study: What are the factors that can explaining the level of
voluntary human capital disclosure in companies with shares in the Brazilian capital market?
Literature review
Studies such as those by Chow and Wong-Boren (1987), Raffounier (1995), Gray, Meek and
Roberts (1995), Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995), Williams (2001) and Macagnan (2005, 2007,
2009)  suggest  certain  factors  of  a  company,  such  as  size,  debt,  profitability,  degree  of
monopoly and market-to-book ratio, that may motivate managers to voluntarily disclose or
withhold  information.  In other  words,  managers’  decisions  to  voluntarily  reveal  or  conceal
information may be related to the economic characteristics of the company. This concept is
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based on two theories. On the one hand, agency theory implies that the higher the level of
disclosure is, the greater the benefits of reducing agency costs may become. On the other
hand, the proprietary costs theory opposes it by raising this question: why do companies not
fully disclose information to gain the greatest possible benefits? (Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1986;
Wagenhofer, 1990; Macagnan, 2005, 2007, 2009). According to the proprietary costs theory,
the  higher  the  level  of  company  information  disclosure  is,  the  higher  the  costs  become
(Wagenhofer,  1990).  Three  types  of  costs  are  considered:  (1)  the  cost  of  preparing  and
communicating information (Verrecchia, 1983; Elliot  & Jacobson, 1994); (2) costs related to
evaluating  earnings  per  share  estimates  (Verrecchia,  1983,  1990)  and  (3)  the  cost  of
competitive advantage loss due to reactions from competitors drawn from the disclosure of
company information (Wagenhofer, 1990).
Understandably, the disclosure of information regarding intangible assets, specifically human
capital, has strategic relevance for enterprises because these features, although not always
recorded  in  accounting,  represent  a  competitive  business  edge  in  the  current  economy.
Tangible and financial assets are more easily purchased in the market than is a qualified group
of  professionals.  Professionals’  qualifications  involve  costs  due  to  training  and  time,  thus
creating opportunities for innovation that will boost a company's competitiveness. Therefore,
the competitive edge of a company may be found in the creation and maintenance of its
intangible  assets.  In  other  words,  the  increased  relevance  given  to  information  regarding
intangible  assets  is  due  to  the  benefits  afforded  by  such  information,  such  as  ‘increased
productivity,  increased  profit  margins,  and,  most  importantly,  innovative  products  and
processes,  which  are  the  only  means  companies  can  use  to  escape  intense  competitive
pressure’ (Lev, 2004: page 116). Therefore, the disclosure of human capital information may
provide benefits  to  a  company,  such as  those resulting  from the reduction  of  information
asymmetry; however, it may also trigger a reaction from competitors, which can result in a
loss of competitive advantage. The hypotheses of the current study are presented next.
Hypotheses formulation
The size of a company is the most commonly analyzed feature in the reviewed studies to
explain the level of disclosure in general. Raffournier (1995), Camfferman and Cooke (2002),
Watson, Shrives and Marston (2002), Bozzolan, Favotto and Ricceri (2003), Prencipe (2004),
Barako, Hancock and Izan (2006), Bronson, Carcello and Raghunandan (2006) and Macagnan
(2007)  tested  the  size  hypothesis.  Large  companies  have  a  greater  number  of  contracts
between managers and shareholders than small companies and, hence, a greater principal-
agent problem. A higher level of disclosure might reduce agency costs between managers and
shareholders. Another motivation for increased disclosure in a large company is the existence
of  a  more  complete  information  system,  which  would  allow  lower  costs  of  obtaining  and
publishing information compared to those incurred by a small company (Watson et al., 2002).
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It  is  also  understood that  a  smaller  company is  more vulnerable  to  a loss  in  competitive
advantage than a larger company. Thus, we formulate the following hypothesis:
H1: Company size is positively related with the level of human capital disclosure
Camfferman and Cooke (2002), Watson et al. (2002), Prencipe (2004), Barako et al. (2006)
and Macagnan (2007) tested the debt hypothesis. The larger a company’s debt is, the more
information the company needs to show the market in an attempt to explain the investments
and justify its degree of debt. Companies with larger debts are significantly more likely to
voluntarily disclose information (Brammer  & Pavelin, 2006). Disclosure represents a means
through  which  managers  may  expose  the  reasons  for  debt.  Therefore,  we  formulate  the
following hypothesis:
H2: The level of debt is positively related to the level of human capital disclosure
Watson  et  al. (2002),  Camfferman and  Cooke  (2002),  Salotti  and  Yamamoto  (2008)  and
Macagnan (2007) tested the profitability  hypothesis.  When a company does not reach the
expected profitability, managers may provide more information to justify to shareholders the
reasons for the low profitability achieved (Wagenhofer, 1990). This disclosure, besides being
used  as  a  justification  for  poor  performance,  may  signal  future  initiatives  undertaken  to
reverse  the  situation.  Therefore,  human  capital  disclosure  could  serve  to  reassure
shareholders. Thus, we formulate the following hypothesis:
H3: Profitability is negatively related to the level of human capital disclosure
Owusu-Ansah (1998), Barako  et al. (2006) and Al-Mutawwa and Hewaidy (2010) tested the
liquidity hypothesis. A liquidity indicator allows for the determination of a company's ability to
meet  its  financial  obligations  in  the  short  term.  Wallace,  Naser  and  Mora  (1994)  found
evidence that managers of companies with low liquidity are motivated to increase disclosure in
an attempt to show its shareholders that they are aware of their lower ability to honor financial
obligations in the short term. Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis:
H4: The degree of liquidity is negatively related to the level of human capital disclosure
Inchausti  (1997),  Watson  et  al. (2002)  and  Macagnan  (2007)  tested  the  paid-dividends
hypothesis. When the company pays dividends to shareholders, it is demonstrating that it is
profitable and that it is prioritizing its own interests. The dividend policy could be used to
reduce agency costs because the regular payment of dividends helps to maintain a company’s
structure and stability, ruling out the transfer of wealth from owners to creditors (Inchausti,
1997). Thus, the lower the payment of dividends to shareholders is, the greater the level of
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disclosure on investment in human resources becomes, which is justified by the possibility of
increasing future earnings. Hence, we propose the following hypothesis:
H5: The amount of dividends paid per share is negatively related to the level of human capital
disclosure
McNally, Eng and Hasseldine (1982), Prencipe (2004) and Bronson  et al. (2006) tested the
growth hypothesis. The number of contracts between managers and shareholders increases
with the growth of a company, emphasizing the problem of information asymmetry. Thus,
disclosing more information could reduce this problem. However, human capital disclosure in
emerging companies could lead to  a loss of  competitive advantage given the competitors’
reactions, which could explain why the fastest growing companies disclose less information.
"Information asymmetry is, undoubtedly, a key component, which constitutes a competitive
advantage" (Spence, 2006: page 2). Consequently, for growing businesses, the disclosure of
information regarding intangible assets could mean a loss of competitive advantage. Therefore,
we formulate the following hypothesis:
H6: A company's growth is negatively related to the level of human capital disclosure
Macagnan (2007) and Salotti  and Yamamoto (2008) tested the stock volatility hypothesis.
Investors spend their funds in shares of companies when their expected return is high enough
to offset the risk of the asset (Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe, 2008). Thus, for companies with
higher volatility in the value of their shares, human capital disclosure could be adjusted to
allow for the further evaluation of its assets, which, consequently, could reduce the volatility of
company stock. Thus, we formulate the following hypothesis:
H7: The volatility of company stock is positively related to level of human capital disclosure
Macagnan (2007) and Salotti  and Yamamoto (2008) tested the floating capital  hypothesis.
When  stock  ownership  is  too  diffused  and  split,  the  shareholder  does  not  have  effective
management control (Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe, 2008). Therefore, when a company has a
high percentage of floating capital, its shares are dispersed throughout the market and held by
many investors.  For  companies  with  more  floating  capital,  human capital  disclosure  could
reduce the problems related to information asymmetry and agency costs. Thus, we formulate
the following hypothesis:
H8: Floating capital is positively related to the level of human capital disclosure
Macagnan  (2007)  tested  the  market-to-book ratio  hypothesis.  The  difference  between the
market  value  of  a  company  and  its  book  value  might  be  explained  by  the  shareholders’
expectations regarding potential future benefits from the company. In an attempt to sustain
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this favorable assessment of the company, managers could increase human capital disclosure
to  justify  that  such  a  difference  in  pricing stems from not  accounting for  human capital.
Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis:
H9: The market-to-book ratio is positively related to the level of human capital disclosure
Abdullah and Ismail (2008) tested the efficiency hypothesis. The more efficient an organization
is in using its assets and raising funds, the greater the manager’s motivation becomes for
human capital disclosure to legitimize his or her management behavior and justify his or her
pay. Thus, we formulate the following hypothesis:
H10: The efficiency of a company is positively related to the level of human capital disclosure
The Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários, CVM) is
the  federal  agency  responsible  for  allowing  public  companies  to  issue  securities  through
registration.  Companies are required to periodically report  certain information to the CVM,
which allows investors to better evaluate the initiatives of companies. The CVM stipulates a
minimum level of disclosure by a company. However, companies that have been registered
with the CVM for a longer time, and thus possess greater maturity and strength in capital
markets,  can reveal  more  information than  companies  with  a  more  recent  registration  to
reduce agency costs. Thus, we formulate the following hypothesis:
H11: The time of registration with the CVM is positively related to the level of human capital
disclosure
Table 1 shows the eleven hypotheses of this study and their relation to the expected level of
voluntary human capital disclosure of companies in the sample.
Order Hypotheses Expected Relation
1 Size +
2 Debt +
3 Profitability –
4 Liquidity –
5 Dividends –
6 Growth –
7 Volatility +
8 Floating Capital +
9 Market-to-book ratio +
10 Efficiency +
11 Time of Registration with CVM +
Table 1. Hypotheses and expected relation
The methodological procedures of this research are detailed below.
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Research design
To identify the relationship between explanatory factors and the level of disclosure, and after
reviewing the empirical literature, we created a model of analysis represented by the following
formula (1):
DLit = ß0 + ß1Totit + ß2Salit + ß3Debtit + ß4Roait + ß5G_Roait + ß6NWCit + ß7Divit + 
ß8Ass_Git+ ß9G_Salit + ß10Volit + ß11G_Floit + ß12SV_BVit + ß13Timit + εit
(1)
where
DL = level of human capital disclosure of company “i” in year “t”; 
ßi = parameters to be estimated;
Totit = total assets of company “i” in year “t”;
Salit = sales of company “i” in year “t”;
Debtit = debt of company “i” in year “t”;
Roait = return on assets of company “i” in year “t”;
G_Roait = ROA growth of company “i” in year “t”;
NWCit = net working capital of company “i” in year “t”;
Divit = earnings per share of company “i” in year “t”;
Ass_Git = assets growth of company “i” in year “t”;
G_Salit = sales growth of company “i” in year “t”;
Volit = share volatility of company “i” in year “t”;
C_Floit = floating capital of company “i” in year “t”;
SV_BVit = share price divided by its book value of company “i” in year “t”;
Timit = time of registration with CVM of company “i” in year “t”;
εit = random error expressing the effect of omitted variables on company “i” in year “t”;
i = companies, from 1 to 29;
t = years, from 2005 to 2009.
It is worth clarifying some aspects of measuring the level of Human Capital Disclosure (DL).
Disclosure is recognized as an abstract concept that cannot be measured directly. Empirical
research studies on the issue use indexes constructed from indicators that better represent the
information to measure the disclosure. The index is a numerical result that represents the
amount of information disclosed by a company. The quality of the information and whether it is
fraudulent or incorrect are not analyzed, even though quantity is sometimes associated with
quality. One might question the subjectivity of the indicators and indexes; however, a different
method that  would  enable  the use of  statistical  techniques in the analysis  of  factors  that
explain the level of disclosure has not yet been developed.
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In this study, we used the disclosure index, comprised of 30 indicators, used in the research by
Macagnan (2005) as Appendix A, which represents information regarding human capital. This
index includes information about intangible assets related to the skills and technical abilities of
company employees (Macagnan 2005, 2007, 2009). The level of disclosure can be obtained by
the following formula (2):
(2)
where nj is the number of human resource disclosure indicators expected for each company, j
is the company, i is the indicator and Xij assumes a value of 1 if the i indicator is revealed and
0 otherwise. Hence, the level of disclosure is the sum of the scores for each indicator (Khanna,
Palepu & Srinivasan 2004). With regard to weighting, this study considered all indicators to be
equivalent and did not assign different weights.
The source of data used to analyze the level of human capital disclosure was the annual report.
The choice of the annual report for review followed the trend of most studies on disclosure. In
addition to representing an official document of the company, the report is a legally recognized
document that can be used in litigation cases.
The explanatory variables representing the hypotheses listed in Table 2 were defined from the
reviewed literature.
Hypotheses Variables Formulas
1. Size
Total Assets Total Assets Value
Total Sales Total Sales Value
2. Debt Debt [(Total Liabilities – Net Equity) / Total Assets] × 100
3. Profitability
Return On Assets (ROA) (Net Profit / Total Assets) × 100
ROA Growth [(ROAt / ROAt-1) -1] × 100
4. Liquidity Net Current Capital Current Assets – Current Liabilities
5. Dividends Earnings per share Earnings per common share
6. Growth
Assets Growth [(Total Assetst / Total Assetst-1) -1] x 100
Sales Growth [(Salest / Salest-1) -1] × 100
7. Volatility Share Volatility (Common Share Volatility) × 100
8. Floating Capital Floating Capital % Floating Capital 
9. Market-to-book ratio Share Value/Book Value (Share price / Share Book Value) × 100
10. Efficiency Working Assets (Sales / Total Assets) × 100
11. Time of Registration with CVM Time of Registration with CVM 2009 – Year of Registration with CVM
Table 2. Hypotheses, variables and respective formulas
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For the explanatory variables, the data sources used here include the information available on
the website of the stock exchange BM&FBovespa and the Economática database. This study
initially included 531 companies listed in the Brazilian Stock Exchange. However, 58 companies
were  excluded  because  their  web  pages  on  the  Internet  were  under  construction  or  had
technical problems, which prevented access to the publication of their annual reports; 440
companies were excluded because they did not provide one or more annual reports on their
web pages; 2 companies were excluded because they had not been listed since 2005; and 2
companies were excluded because they were incorporated into other companies in the period
2005-2009. Therefore, the final number of companies studied was 29, from 2005 to 2009 (five
years), which resulted in a final sample of 145 annual reports reviewed. The annual reports
were analyzed using content analysis, in which human resources disclosures were found. The
software EViews was used to process the data and obtain the statistical results of empirical
investigation.
The empirical investigation
The analysis of factors explaining the level of voluntary human capital disclosure, through the
technique  of  multiple  linear  regression  using  panel  data,  was  preceded  by  three
considerations:  (i)  descriptive  analysis  of  the  level  of  disclosure,  (ii)  correlation  analysis
between the explanatory variables, and (iii) analysis of fixed or random effect on panel data. 
The  descriptive  analysis  of  the  level  of  disclosure  of  the  sample  indicated  that  the  basic
industry sector is the most representative sample, with a participation percentage of 44.8%. It
is 29.9% more representative than the trade, services and transport sector and 116.4% more
representative  than the manufacturing sector.  Regarding trade,  transport  and services and
manufacturing sectors, the former is 66.7% more representative than the latter. 
The correlation analysis between the explanatory variables, the results of which are presented
in Table 3, only allowed for the selection variables that were not significantly correlated. Thus,
the model only included variables with correlations inferior to 0.59. Therefore, among the 11
tested cases, there is no significant correlation between the explanatory variables that could
affect the consistency of the results. 
The analysis of fixed or random effects in the panel data identified, which effect would be most
appropriate for the model. Through the Hausman test (Wooldridge, 2010), we found that one
or more of the variables used were correlated with the unobserved effect. For this reason, the
regression was performed with the fixed effect. Below, we analyze the model results.
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1. Ass 1.00              
2. Sal 0.48 1.00             
3. Debt 0.47 0.01 1.00            
4. Roa -0.27 -0.02 -0.30 1.00           
5. G_Roa -0.01 -0.01 -0.11 0.30 1.00          
6. NWC 0.28 0.07 0.12 -0.08 -0.01 1.00         
7. Div -0.03 0.09 0.08 0.21 0.00 -0.10 1.00        
8. G_Ass 0.20 0.05 0.13 -0.12 -0.14 0.14 -0.12 1.00       
9. G_Sal 0.00 -0.04 0.01 0.08 0.32 -0.01 -0.07 0.35 1.00      
10. Vol 0.10 0.28 -0.08 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.54 -0.03 -0.06 1.00     
11. C_Flo 0.29 0.29 -0.08 -0.01 -0.12 0.41 -0.21 0.29 0.08 -0.04 1.00    
12. SV_BV -0.03 -0.04 0.12 0.51 -0.04 0.01 0.20 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.03 1.00   
13. C_Ass -0.51 -0.19 -0.40 0.30 0.10 -0.17 -0.05 -0.10 0.11 -0.02 -0.10 0.00 1.00  
14. Tim 0.44 0.30 -0.06 -0.12 0.07 0.15 -0.31 -0.02 -0.14 -0.04 0.24 -0.31 -0.19 1.00
Table 3. Correlation matrix of explanatory variables
Table 4 presents the results of statistical regression. Given the adjusted R-squared value, one
can infer that 66.3% of the variations in the level of disclosure can be explained by variations
in the explanatory variables. As a result, one cannot reject six variables as explaining the level
of voluntary human capital disclosure, which showed significance levels of 1% and 5%.
Dependent Variable: DL
Method: Panel data by Ordinary Least Squares Effect: Fixed
Sample: 29 Companies Period: 2005–2009 Total Observations: 145
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t Statistics Probability
Ass -0.047931 0.008005 -5.987543 0.0000*
Sal 0.218208 0.050288 4.339136 0.0000*
Debt 0.245744 0.099985 2.457819 0.0155**
G_Ass -0.096876 0.022859 -4.238010 0.0000*
G_Sal -0.091520 0.044878 -2.039315 0.0438**
Tim 1.413947 0.445203 3.175961 0.0019*
Constant 5.321690 12.28038 0.433349 0.6656
R-square 0.742591 F Statistics 9.333385
R-square adjusted 0.663028 Prob (F Statistics) 0.000000
Prob (White Test) 0.996147 Durbin-Watson 1.893186
* significance at the 1% level
** significance at the 5% level
Table 4. Results
According to the results shown in Table 4, the greater the sales, debt and time of registration
with the CVM variables are, the higher the level of voluntary human capital disclosure will be.
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However, the greater the total assets, asset growth and sales growth variables are, the lesser
the level of voluntary human capital disclosure will be.
The size hypothesis, represented by the variable total assets, cannot be rejected as explaining
voluntary human capital disclosure due to its significance level of 1%. Notwithstanding, it did
show a negative relationship with disclosure, contrary to the results of all  of the reviewed
studies that  did not  reject  the size  hypothesis.  This  same hypothesis,  represented by the
variable  sales,  cannot  be  rejected;  its  significance  level  was  1%.  It  did  show  a  positive
relationship  with  disclosure,  confirming the  results  by  Cooke  (1989,  1996),  Wallace  et  al.
(1994),  Meek  et  al. (1995),  Raffournier  (1995),  Inchausti  (1997),  Bozzolan  et  al. (2003),
Prencipe (2004) and Macagnan (2007). The results of the size hypothesis, represented by the
sales variable, can be explained by agency theory because the larger a company is, the greater
the number of contracts the company will have and, consequently, the greater the information
asymmetry between managers and shareholders will be. This effect may generate a greater
demand for disclosure in the quest to reduce agency costs.
The debt hypothesis cannot be rejected; its significance level was 5%, presenting a positive
relationship with the disclosure. This result confirms the studies by Malone, Frie and Jones
(1993), Hossain, Perera and Rahman (1995), Mitchell, Chia and Loh (1995), Cooke (1996),
Richardson and Welker (2001), Williams (2001), Bujaki and McConomy (2002), Camfferman
and Cooke (2002), Ferguson, Lam and Lee (2002), Prencipe (2004), Barako et al. (2006) and
Macagnan (2007). The outcome of the debt hypothesis can be explained by agency theory
because the management would disclose more information to reduce information asymmetry;
that is, a greater level of disclosure could justify a high company debt because it would be due
to investments in human capital.
The growth hypothesis, represented by the total assets and sales growth variables, cannot be
rejected;  the  variables  exhibited  significance  levels  of  1% and  5%,  respectively,  and  are
negatively correlated with the level of disclosure. This result confirms the results from the
studies of Bronson et al (2006). The larger company growth is, the lower the level of human
capital  disclosure  will  be.  This  result  supports  the  proprietary  costs  theory  because  more
information increases the chances of a company suffering a loss in competitive advantage.
The hypothesis regarding the time of registration with the CVM, which was not compared to
any study reviewed, cannot be rejected as explaining the level of human capital disclosure. At
a significance level of 1%, it shows a positive relationship with disclosure. This result provides
evidence to support agency theory because managers of companies that are registered with
the CVM for a longer period of time may have disclosed more information to the market in an
attempt to improve the evaluation of shares.
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The  profitability,  liquidity,  floating  capital  and  market-to-book  ratio  hypotheses  were
statistically rejected. We found no significant relationship between the variables representing
these hypotheses and the level of voluntary human capital disclosure.
Conclusions
The aim of this study was to analyze the factors explaining the level of voluntary human capital
disclosure by companies listed on the BM&FBovespa during the period of 2005-2009. Faced
with the problem of information asymmetry, human capital disclosure may be a way to reduce
the level of information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. The study was based
on  the  fact  that  companies  have  different  levels  of  disclosure  and,  therefore,  on  the
motivations of management to voluntarily reveal more or less information.
To analyze the results obtained, we used the assumptions of two theories: Agency theory,
which states that disclosure can reduce agency costs, and the proprietary costs theory, which
notes that disclosure may create costs for the company. Given the strategic importance of
information on intangible assets, the analysis focused on human capital disclosure.
The main results of this study indicate that the following should not be rejected: size, debt,
growth and time of registration with the CVM hypotheses, with significance levels of 1% and
5%, as explaining the level of human capital disclosure. However, the profitability, liquidity,
dividend  per  share,  floating  capital,  market-to-book  ratio,  stock  volatility  and  efficiency
hypotheses were rejected. An important contribution of this research is the formulation and
non-repudiation of the time of registration with the CVM hypothesis as a factor that explains
the level of human capital disclosure because none of the revised studies have tested this
hypothesis.
Regarding  the  reviewed  theories,  it  appears  that  none  of  them  can  fully  explain  the
management motivation for voluntary human capital disclosure. However, with respect to the
model used in this study, we can conclude the following:
• The hypotheses of size (sales), debt and time of registration with the CVM are explained
based on the assumptions of agency theory. The positive relationship indicates that
managers’ motivation for voluntary disclosure is justified by the reduction in information
asymmetry between managers and shareholders; 
• The hypotheses of size (total assets) and growth (total assets and sales) are explained
based  on  the  assumptions  of  the  proprietary  costs  theory  because  the  costs  of
competitive  advantage  losses  in  human  capital  disclosure  outweigh  the  benefits  of
reducing information asymmetry. 
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The study was limited to examining only the presence or absence of voluntary human capital
disclosure in annual reports. Therefore, the evaluation of these resources was not within the
scope of this research; moreover, intangible liabilities were not covered. 
For future studies, we recommend the replication of this study in a sample of companies from
another  country  to  conduct  a  comparative  analysis  of  results,  which  would  enhance  the
understanding  of  the  factors  explaining  the  level  of  voluntary  human  capital  disclosure.
Another possibility for research could be analysing the another media of comunication used by
the companies, like the information disclosure in the internet via websites.
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Appendix A. Indicators representative of information regarding human
capital establishing the disclosure index
TEMS
1. HUMAN CAPITAL
Number of employees
Progression in the number of employees in recent years
Number of terminations
New Hires
Absence or lack of staff
External rotation of staff
Internal rotation of staff
Employees scaled by seniority
Employees scaled by job description
Employees scaled by age
Employees scaled by education
Employees scaled by gender
Employees scaled by region
Description of training activities undertaken
Training activities hours
Training expenses
Employees with access to training
Hiring policy/recruitment
Pay policy and system
Career plan
Incentives program
Company benefits and social programs 
Health and safety policy
Information on collective agreements
Measures of employee satisfaction
Production or productivity per employee
Revenue per employee
Work experience of chief executives in other companies
Education of chief executives
New hiring of executives
Source: Macagnan (2005)
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